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Abstract 
In this study, we examine the correlation between managerial pay dispersion and 
firm performance. We conduct a horse race between two different theories---tournament 
theory versus behavioral theory. We come to the conclusion that firm performance, 
measured by abnormal return, is positively associated with managerial compensation 
dispersion. The result is in consistent with the tournament theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Smart investors try to find companies that can outperform their rivals. Of course there 
are various factors affecting firm performance. In this paper, we focus on the relationship 
between executive compensation dispersion and firm performance.  
After the economic crisis, executive compensation has become a concern of investors.  
Firms always offer considerable compensation to CEOs as incentive if they achieve 
certain operating goals. As a result, CEOs prefer higher risk projects in order to get 
higher return, which may be the reason for market crush. Many papers focus on the 
relationship between dispersion of executive compensation and firm performance and 
have several significant findings. Generally speaking, there are two opposite theories 
—— tournament theory and behavioral theory. According to tournament theory, a high 
dispersion in executive compensation, where the higher level executives are paid much 
more than executives that are just below them (i.e., having a high dispersion in executive 
compensation), provides incentives for executives to exert effort and work hard in order 
to be promoted within the company towards the top position (see Conyon, Peck and 
Sandler, 2001). The compensation of top executives is economically efficient because it 
is secured by considerable salary served as incentive to the lower position managers who 
are getting paid less than their own expected marginal product and willing to join the 
tournament, in which the big prize is the top executive’s job (Lazer and Rosen, 1981). 
Behavioral theory suggests that when the pay is more or less equal, it promotes 
collaboration, which can strengthen firm performance .The behavioral theory is based on 
the idea that people tend to compare themselves to others —— when they see that 
co-executives are paid much more, they envy one another (See Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 
1990). That can potentially reduce their motivation and create conflicts within the 
organization.  
In order to quantify firm performance, we use abnormal returns. We analyzed 81,720 
firm-month observations, representing 454 listed firms from 1999-2013. We partition 15 
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years from 1999 to 2013 into three 5-year time period in to be able to get abnormal 
returns based on monthly data (i.e., 60 months firm level regressions for calculating 
abnormal return). We estimate company’s abnormal return within each time period by 
using Fama-French three-factor model. We compute the HHI of managerial total 
compensation for each firm as the measure of compensation dispersion. Then we 
compute the 5-year average HHI for each firm at each time period. Finally, we regress the 
abnormal return on HHI and other control variables and find that there is a positive 
correlation between abnormal return and HHI, indicating that firm performance, 
measured by abnormal return, is positively associated with the managerial compensation 
dispersion. 
2. Prior researches and our hypotheses 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) suggest that there is a balance between 
tournament theory and behavioral theory as predictor of firm performance. When 
monitoring is reliable and cost is low, paying managers on a basis of their marginal 
products and choosing the employee with better performance for promotion are both 
appropriate for improving firm performance. When monitoring is unreliable or expensive, 
agents will have stronger motives to shirk, so paying on basis of marginal products is not 
feasible and choosing the appropriate employee for promotion becomes more difficult. In 
this case, due to tremendous cost or unreliable resulting from monitoring, firms prefer 
spending their money on incentives and let managers working for the prize. As a result, 
the interrank compensation gaps become larger, compensation gaps between ranks grow 
with hierarchical level and the gap between the biggest prize, which is the CEO’s 
compensation, and the second-high compensation is the greatest of all gaps. 
2.1 Tournament theory and the first hypothesis 
According to tournament theory, tournament shows its advantages in three aspects. 
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First, compensation is based on rankings, so that monitoring costs are lower. Second, 
larger compensation gap gives managers incentives to be higher ranked. As a result, 
shrinking becomes less common. Third, managers who have been successfully promoted 
before also have incentives to work hard for a better position because the pay gaps are 
larger and larger.  
There are some evidences supporting tournament theory. Lazer and Rosen (1981) 
found that the compensation gap is effective because lower-position managers are willing 
to join the tournament to get better paid. Conyon, Peck and Sandler (2001) argue that 
high dispersion of executive compensation can be incentives for manager to chase a 
better-paid job position. Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran(2009) conclude that short-term  
and long-term compensation gaps between CEO and other competitors positively affect 
firm performance. They also found that if the CEO is close to retirement, tournament 
becomes more motivating. If the CEO is new to firm, tournament is less useful. Lin, Yeh 
and Shih (2010) argue that the relationship between tournament and firm performance is 
industry-specific. For low R&D level firms, tournament theory works well while in 
high-tech firms; the pay gaps cannot always strengthen firm performance. O’Reilly, Main 
and Crystal (1988) and Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993) are in favor of tournament 
theory. They suggest that the size of the prize should increase with the increasing number 
of contestants. 
Tournament theory assumes that compensation gaps are incentives for executives to 
compete for higher positions. As a result, firm performance is improved. Therefore, we 
developed our first hypothesis based on tournament theory.  
 
H1: Top-five executive compensation dispersion is positively related to firm performance. 
2.2 Behavioral theory and the second hypothesis 
The behavior theory suggests that pay dispersion is critical for firms in both 
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psychological and sociopolitical way. The theory believes the small difference between 
top managers and lower-lever managers can help people cooperatively contribute to 
organization’s goals. There are two theories concerning behavioral theory.  
First one is relative deprivation theory. Martin (1981) states that, according to 
relative deprivation theory, when people compare the rewards the get to other people’s 
rewards and find they receive less than they deserve, they get the feeling to injustice and 
experience deprivation. Cowherd and Levine (1992) argue that experience of deprivation 
can lead to a hopeful or a frustrated attitude to the possibility of change. Levine (1992) 
found that decreasing compensation difference increase people’s cohesiveness, which 
could lead to group’s higher productivity. Few empirical studies tested relative 
deprivation theory. Hambrick and Siegel (1993) found that for firms in industries where 
executive cooperation was important, the smaller pay gaps between ranks are, the higher 
stock returns is.  
The second theory is allocation preference theory. Allocation preference theory 
describes how compensation is set. Freeman and Montanari (1980) imply that pay is set 
by a criterion that can avoid dissatisfactions among employees. Leventhal, Karuza and 
Fry (1980) suggest that such dissatisfaction could lead to negative consequences for 
allocators. Specifically, it may pose threat to allocator’s authority and status. Henderson 
and Fredrickson (2001) allocation is significant when (1) maintaining social harmony is 
important, (2) assessing individuals’ marginal contributions is hard to achieve, (3) 
competition is likely to result in sabotage of interdependent work efforts, and (4) 
collaboration is vital (See Leventhal Karuza and Fry, 1980).  
Behavioral theory suggests that smaller pay gaps will promote collaboration and 
reduce the probability of sabotage. Based on behavioral theory, we developed our second 
hypothesis. 
 
H2: Top-five executive compensation dispersion is negatively related to firm 
performance. 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data Source  
 Our sample is drawn from firms listed in the Execucomp of WRDS from 1999-2013. 
We use “cusip” as identification number of the firms and “tdc1” (the total compensation, 
which is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual, restricted stock grants and long term 
incentives) to measure compensation.  
 We obtain monthly return data and monthly factor data from CRSP database and 
Fama-French Portfolios and Factors database of WRDS, respectively. Monthly data is 
applied to measure the alpha of firm in each period. Moreover, we obtain annual financial 
statement data from the Compustat database. 
 We use “cusip” as firm identification number to combine compensation data, 
monthly return data and annually financial data for each company.  Companies that have 
fewer than five top executives and those that do not have complete 60 monthly return 
data are excluded from our sample.  After filtering companies that have incomplete 
information, we construct our final data sample consisting of 81,720 firm-month 
observations, representing 454 listed firms from 1999-2013. 
3.2 Model and methodology 
We measure firm performance by Alpha, which is calculated from Fama and French 
three-factor model using monthly data. Alpha is the dependent variable of our regression. 
According to Barron and Waddell (2003), the five highest paid executives are considered 
as the top management team. Compensation dispersion is measured by the Herfinahl 
index (also known as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI) according to the following 
formula, 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = ∑{
𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒′𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
}
2
 
 
We partition the whole 1999 to 2013 period into three 5-year periods, 1999 to 2003, 
2004 to 2008 and 2008 to 2013. Then we calculate the yearly HHI and five-year average 
HHI for each company. 
A lot of researches use Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. In this paper, we 
choose abnormal return as measurement of firm performance. To calculate abnormal 
return, we use Fama and French three-factor model as follows, 
𝑅𝑖  − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 × (𝑅𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽2 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿 +  𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝑅𝑖 is the return of the firm, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free return, 𝑅𝑀 is the return of 
the market, SMB stands for "Small Minus Big" which means the return of firms with 
small market capitalization minus the return of firms with big market capitalization. HML 
stands for "High Minus Low" which means the return of firms with high book-to-market 
ratio minus the return of firms with low book-to-market ratio.  
By applying the monthly data to the Fama and French three-factor Model, we 
obtained the estimated alpha for each period. Four control variables are introduced in our 
model. 
The first control variable is market size. The second one is R&D expense divided by 
sales. Cui and Mak (2001) found that the relationship between firm performance and 
managerial ownership is a W-shaped, which showcase the significance of industry effects 
between firm performance and managerial ownership. For high R&D firms, firm 
performance is negatively related to managerial ownership but positively and 
significantly related to the squared managerial ownership. The third one is ROA. Jensen, 
Michael and Murphy (1990b) suggest ROA is an accounting return that is extremely 
important in determining executive compensation. Paul (1992) argues that ROA can 
provide information about the extra value to the firm added by the CEO. Therefore, top 
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managers have motives to make decisions and report income in a way that ROA is higher, 
which can affect their compensation. The last one is leverage ratio. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) suggest that more profitable companies will reduce their demand for debt, because 
internal will be available to finance investment. They would have more retention or 
investment so they prefer building their equity rather than their debt. Debt ratio is an 
accounting ratio that can reflect a company’s debt policy. 
Then we develop our regression model,  
 
 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽5 ×
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖 
where Alphai is the abnormal return we get from the Fama and French three-factor 
Model. HHIi is the 5 year average Herfinahl index we computed previously for each firm. 
SIZEi is the natural logarithm of the firms’ 5-year average market value. RDSALESi is 
calculated by dividing firms’ 5-year average research and development expense by 
sales. ROAi is the 5-year average return on asset. LEVi is a 5-year average leverage ratio, 
calculated by dividing the long-term debt by equity. βl, βm and βn are coefficients 
associated with variables describing firm, industry and time period. εi is a zero mean 
error term that is uncorrelated with independent variables. 
4. Empirical results and Discussion 
4.1 HHI value 
We use HHI index to measure the dispersion of the top five executives’ 
compensation. The results are shown in the table below： 
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Table 1: HHI Value in Three Periods 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
HHI(1999-2003) 454 0.2726673 0.084097 0.1376829 0.8886119 
HHI(2004-2008) 454 0.2670737 0.064231 0.1492836 0.6472647 
HHI(2009-2013) 454 0.2685237 0.056015 0.1481874 0.5934191 
 
In addition, we compute the average annual HHI for all observations to see the trend 
in HHI. The trend is displayed in the following graph: 
 
Graph 1: Average HHI Trend from 1999 to 2013 
 
 
We can observe that there is a decreasing trend of HHI during the period from 1999 
to 2009, and it rebounded after 2009. 
4.2 Alpha value 
In this section, we compute the abnormal return (measured by alpha) and run the 
Student-T test on alpha for each period. The results are summarized in Table2 as follows: 
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Table 2: Alpha Values in Three Periods 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max P Value 95% Conf. Interval 
Alpha(1999-2003) 454  0.0131  0.0188  -0.0396  0.1087  0.0000  0.0113  0.0148  
Alpha(2004-2008) 454  0.0048  0.0130  -0.0394  0.0538  0.0000  0.0036  0.0060  
Alpha(2009-2013) 454  0.0032  0.0122  -0.0515  0.0568  0.0000  0.0020  0.0043  
 
We observe that during each of the three time periods alpha value is significantly 
different from zero. 
4.3 Association between compensation dispersion and abnormal return 
 All estimated values of coefficients for independent variables are shown in Table 3 
below. The regression model is used to investigate the correlation between managerial 
pay dispersion and firm performance. 
 In column (1), the result demonstrates that there exists a strong positive correlation 
between alpha and HHI at 95% confidence level, which confirms the positive relationship 
between managerial pay dispersion and firm performance. 
 The significance test results from applying industry-time and firm-time fixed effect 
models are shown in column (2) and (3) respectively. After omitting the effects of 
industry, firm and time, we find strong positive correlation between alpha and HHI at 95% 
confidence level in both models. 
 In addition, we add SIZE, RDSALE, ROA and LEV as control variables in the 
regression model and the result is displayed in column (4). Same results can be achieved 
from this scenario; that is to say, there is a positive relationship between abnormal return 
and HHI at 95% confidence level. Interestingly, one of the control variables, RDSALE, 
has a significant positive impact on abnormal return. It is probably because the return on 
investment of research and development surpasses the required return. The other two 
control variables, ROA and LEV, have a positive relationship with abnormal return at 90% 
confidence level. 
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 Compared to column (2) and (3), column (5) and (6) also apply industry-time and 
firm-time fixed effect models respectively but add four control variables. Both HHI and 
RDSALE show positive correlations with abnormal return. However, the other three 
control variables show no significant impact on firm performance.
Table 3 Regression Results 
Independent 
variables 
Y=Alpha (abnormal return) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HHI 0.0161**(0.00670) 0.0178**(0.00580) 0.0209**(0.00940) 0.0163**(0.00661) 0.0185**(0.00767) 0.0213**(0.00909) 
SIZE 
   
0.000972(0.001279) 0.000901(0.002234) 0.000833(0.001793) 
RDSALE 
   
0.000978***(0.000267) 0.000759**(0.00157) 0.00654**(0.00335) 
ROA 
   
0.00192*(0.001565) 0.00074(0.00856) 0.000110(0.00722) 
LEV       0.0105*(0.00916) 0.00501(0.00922) 0.00432(0.00679) 
Constant 0.002768**(0.00168) 0.00653*(0.00156) 0.00798***(0.00268) -0.00331*(0.00284) -0.04672***(0.01214) -0.0577***(0.00992) 
Firm control? NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Industry 
control? 
NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Time control? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Adj. R-squared 0.0955 0.1345 0.142 0.1223 0.1421 0.1580 
Notes: The dependent variable is the abnormal return. Alpha stands for the abnormal return we get from Fama and French three factor model. HHI is the 5-year average Herfinahl index we compute for 
each firm. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 5-year average market size. RDSALES is average proportion, which is the sum of research and development costs divided by sales. ROA is the 5-year 
average return on assets. LEV is the 5-year average leverage ratio which is total debt divided by total assets. βl to βn are coefficients associated with variables describing the characteristics of firm, 
industry and time period. ε is the zero mean error term that is uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
Firm control in column is according to cusip. Industry control is according to 2-digit SIC code. Time control is according to three time periods. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 10% level. 
**Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
***Estimated coefficient or T-statistic is significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
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5. Limitation  
 The data we collected is from 1999-2013 and all companies in the sample are U.S. 
listed companies. In addition, we exclude companies with less than 5 top executives and 
we also delete companies with incomplete return or financial data during the whole 
period. Therefore, we only get 454 sample companies. If we use different time period or 
companies from different area, the result may change. 
 Additionally, besides the control variables we discussed above, there maybe some 
other potential factors that contributes to the abnormal return. The influence of omitted 
variables results in error term, interacting with independent variables, and this interaction 
can cause endogeneity problem.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the association between top executives’ compensation dispersion 
and firm performance. According to our regression results, we find a significantly 
positive correlation between compensation dispersion and firm performance. The result 
supports the first hypothesis and tournament theory is proved. 
We also find that research and development intensity has a significantly positive 
correlation with firm performance. This may indicate that companies spending more 
proportion of investment on research and development are likely to create higher 
abnormal return.  
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